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The Regulation of Personal Health Record
Systems in Canada
James Williams, Jens H. Weber-Jahnke*
INTRODUCTION
Health care systems in North America, Europe, and other parts of the world
are being challenged by rising service costs and aging populations. In response to
these concerns, governments and health care providers are seeking to improve the
efficiency and efficacy of health care delivery. Among other initiatives, they have
invested vast sums of money into information and communications technologies,
including decision support systems, telemedicine, and electronic records. In Canada, the efficiency and quality gains expected from electronic health information
systems have prompted the federal government to devote billions of dollars of
funding towards the goal of a pan-Canadian electronic health record (EHR) system.
On a provincial level, governments have launched several initiatives to increase the
utilization of medical records systems by physicians and other health practitioners.
Despite the growing prevalence of health information software, it is not clear
that patients have benefited from the accessibility that these systems allegedly provide. This situation is somewhat disconcerting, given that the jurisprudence in Canada indicates that patients have a right to access their personal health information
(PHI) stored in medical records systems.1 While legislation also provides for a right
of access in many provinces,2 actually obtaining access to PHI in the custody and
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James Williams, BA, BSc, JD, MSc is a privacy/security consultant with Ontario’s
“Community Care Information Management” program. Jens Weber-Jahnke, Dipl.
Inform., Dr. rer. nat., PEng, is Director of Software Engineering and associate
professor at the University of Victoria.
The right of a patient to access their own health records has been considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 93
D.L.R. (4th) 415 (S.C.C.), the Court decided that patients had a right to access their
health records. The Court based this right of access not on property rights, but on the
fiduciary duty owed by the physician to the patient. In making this distinction, the
Court affirmed the principle in Lamothe v. Mokleby (1979), 4 Sask. R. 352, 106 D.L.R.
(3d) 233 (Sask. Q.B.), that the physician owns the records themselves, along with the
system that the records are stored in. In addition, various provincial statutes also make
it clear that health care providers own health records. For instance, the Ontario Public
Hospitals Act, s. 14(1) states that “the record of personal health information compiled
in a hospital for a patient is the property of the hospital”. a discussion of the interplay
between common law and privacy law surrounding rights of access, see Rousseau v.
Wyndowe, 2008 FCA 39, 71 Admin. L.R. (4th) 58 (F.C.A.).
For example, the Personal Health Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c.3, Sch. A,
[PHIPA] s. 52(1) provides a right of access to one’s own personal health information,
(barring a few exceptions).
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control of a health care provider can be a costly and time-consuming process. Not
only must a patient make a request to the custodian, whose staff members may be
overtaxed with routine operational duties, but also there are often issues with respect to composing records from disparate sources and severing the contents of
records. The presence of case notes, comments, and other work product artefacts
can complicate the process, as health care providers are generally reluctant to share
this type of information with patients.3
The personal health record (PHR) has the potential to solve the problem of
access by fundamentally altering the manner in which patients interact with health
care providers. As opposed to EHR systems, the patient manages the information in
a PHR, giving them access to their information on demand. In terms of recent
trends, many health care organizations in the United States have developed bridges
by which information generated by health care professionals (e.g., diagnostic reports) can be transferred to a PHR system without labour-intensive manual intervention. The vision of the PHR is that of a patient-managed repository that contains
an entire history of care, including prescriptions, care episodes, and billing information. The question of how to provide patient-access to health information effectively disappears, since the health record becomes inherently patient-centric.
Online tools that provide patients with instant access to a longitudinal, patientmanaged repository of PHI also have ramifications for the degree to which patients
can participate in the management of their own health. The PHR may serve as a
tool by which health care providers can encourage patients to become active partners in their health — a strategy that has been cited in the research literature as
offering major advantages to the health care system on both a micro and macro
level.4 Some researchers have suggested that participation in their own health care
management can make patients more health conscious.5
In addition to encouraging self-management, PHR systems also have the potential to support online communities devoted to health care. Although these systems are still in their infancy, the marketplace evidences a noticeable trend towards
the inclusion of features from the social networking domain. PHR systems such as
PatientsLikeMe are explicitly built around the concept of an online network of patients who share personal health information, recommend practitioners, voluntarily
report metrics on pharmaceutical usage, and provide support and encouragement to
one another.
The advent of social networking applications has provided users with a new
array of tools to facilitate collaboration and communication. However, the flexibility inherent to the design of these applications has given rise to significant concerns
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See S.B. Frampton, S. Horowitz, and B.J. Stumpo, “Open medical records” (2009)
109:8 American Journal of Nursing 59.
See B. Fisher, V. Bhavnani, and M. Winfield, “How patients use access to their full
health records: a qualitative study of patients in general practice” (2009) 102:12 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 539.
See V. Franklin et al., “Patients’ Engagement With ‘Sweet Talk’ — A Text Messaging
Support System for Young People With Diabetes” (2008) 10:2 Journal of Medical Internet Research 20.
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about privacy, security, and data quality.6 Regulatory authorities in Canada have
taken increasing interest in social networking, as evidenced by the Privacy Commissioner’s recent report on Facebook.7 Given that PHI is one of the most sensitive
types of personal information, the use of online social networking techniques in the
health care domain is a matter of no small interest to regulators, health care providers, and patients.
This paper analyzes the regulatory regime for PHR systems in Canada. The
first part of the paper consists of an introduction to some of the major issues associated with these applications, with a focus on privacy, security, data quality, and
interoperability. Following this preliminary discussion, the bulk of the analysis
deals with the legal instruments that apply to PHR products developed by private
sector organizations. Due to space constraints, the paper concentrates on legislative
and regulatory instruments, deferring a discussion of the possible impacts of tort,
product liability, and contract law on PHR systems.8 Despite this omission, it is
clear that the current regulatory regime is not well suited to handling some of the
challenges arising from this type of application. Given the market indicators on the
popularity of PHR systems, there is need for future work in this area, both by the
research community and by regulatory agencies.

I. PERSONAL HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS
(a) Background
The difficulty involved in accessing one’s own medical information is not a
recent phenomenon. In the traditional physician-patient relationship, the physician
has had exclusive access to information on diagnoses and treatment; patients could
take little initiative, due to their relative lack of knowledge, and the paucity of resources at their disposal.
This situation began to change in the late twentieth century. In addition to the
advent of direct-to-consumer advertising, the appearance of the Internet allowed
patients to access current and peer-reviewed health information resources directly.9
The first generation of websites devoted to health care consisted of health portals — online catalogues of information on health care. At the time of writing, patients can access a wide variety of online resources, reducing the traditional information asymmetry with respect to conditions and treatments.
Although the introduction of online health portals greatly improved the availability of information, patients still face major hurdles in accessing their own health
information. Given that many experts in the field of health care have extolled the

6
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See J. Williams, “Social Networking Applications in Health Care: Threats to the Privacy and Security of Health Information” (2010) Proceedings of 2nd Intl. ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering in Health Care 39.
PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-008.
A discussion of the interface between PHR systems and tort, product liability and contract law would be highly interesting. However, it would also be a significant undertaking that is well beyond the scope of this paper.
See P. Bleicher, “Health 2.0: Do it yourself doctoring” (2008) 17 Applied Clinical Trials 38.
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benefits arising from preventative medicine and patient empowerment, this state of
affairs does not have positive implications for the sustainability of health care systems in Canada and abroad.
The answer to the question of accessibility may come in the form of a new
breed of health information management application. Personal health record
(PHR) systems are patient-managed repositories of PHI that allow users to store
longitudinal and comprehensive records of their health data. Individuals can use
these applications to manage their personal health information, including medication histories, immunizations, past procedures, allergies, and insurance plans. Information in the PHR can also be shared with family members, friends, and health
care providers at the owner’s discretion, through the use of social networking features or role based access controls. The ability to grant access to other individuals
supports a variety of usage scenarios, such as legal guardianship and substitute decision-making.
The inclusion of social networking mechanisms in PHR systems is a significant recent development, as it expands the scope of the application beyond simply
providing access to information, namely towards a platform for collaboration in
health care. The term “Medicine 2.0” has been used to denote the use of social
computing for purposes of promoting collaboration between patients, caregivers,
and
health
care
providers.10
As
an
example,
HealthyCircles
(www.healthycircles.com) allows users to access provider registries, diet plans,
telemedicine, and interactive health-monitoring applications; health care practitioners may collaborate with patients by joining a patient’s care team. The power of
collaboration is significant, and even outside of the PHR domain, there are rapidly
growing online communities devoted to particular health ailments.11

(b) The PHR
A PHR is a health record that is controlled by a patient, rather than by a health
care provider.12 In the words of one researcher, patients decide what is included,
where it comes from and who can see it.13 Although some PHRs have been created
for mobile devices such as USB keys and smartphones, the most salient and popular examples of PHRs consist of online health records management systems such as
HealthVault, Google Health, and Dossia. In the latter case, the PHR is managed by
a site operator — an organization that develops, deploys, and maintains the
software. In addition, the site operator furnishes the infrastructure (typically servers
hosting relational database management systems) on which the information resides.
The servers involved may be located at the site operator’s various facilities, or they
may be distributed in a “cloud”.

10
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See G. Eysenbach, “Medicine 2.0: social networking, collaboration, participation,
apomediation, and openness” (2008) 10:3 Journal of Medical Internet Research e22.
See supra note 10.
See T. Van Deursen, P. Koster, and M. Pektovic, “Reliable Personal Health Records”
(2008) Proceedings of eHealth Beyond the Horizon — Get IT There 484.
D. Stewart, “Socialized Medicine: How Personalized Health Records and Social Networks are changing Health Care” online: (2009) 32:7 EContent 30
<http://www.econtentmag.com>.
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One of the main functions of a PHR is to serve as a repository for both patientgenerated data (i.e., self-reported metrics such as blood pressure) and data that has
been created by health care providers. In order to provide some clarity, we introduce four usage scenarios that take account of the different ways in which information may be exchanged between a PHR and health care providers:
In the Isolated PHR usage scenario, the patient is responsible for loading information into the PHR, granting other individuals access, and extracting data in a
form that is readable by a health care provider. Patients may load information that
has been produced by professionals, such as diagnostic reports or prescriptions, but
the process is entirely driven by the patient.
The Data Sink usage scenario extends the isolated PHR approach by allowing
health care providers to upload information to the PHR. As an example, Health
Management Organizations in the United States have automated the process of
uploading diagnostic reports and billing information to PHRs such as Dossia.
Mainstream services such as Google Health allow patients to upload the results of
laboratory tests or other diagnostic procedures, but the process is simplified greatly
if the provider has control over the upload process.
In the Data Source scenario, the isolated PHR approach is modified by allowing health care providers to download information from the PHR. For instance,
the patient may have used a monitoring device to load daily blood pressure readings into her PHR record. By downloading this data, a physician would be provided
with self-reported health metrics by which she may formulate a care plan for the
patient.
Lastly, the Interoperable PHR combines the data sink and data source scenarios, allowing health care providers to upload and download information from the
PHR. Since multiple providers may be involved in exchanging data with a PHR,
the participating information systems should conform to interoperability standards
that allow data to be drawn from multiple sources and reconciled within the PHR’s
data model.14

(c) Social Computing
As mentioned above, PHR systems are moving towards incorporating features
from social computing systems — web-enabled applications that put an emphasis
on online social networking and collaboration. Although the original World Wide
Web was intended to support collaboration through the use of email, hyperlinks,
and bulletin boards, information on first generation websites generally flowed in
one direction. The second generation of websites placed a high degree of emphasis
on participation, including collaboration and content generation by users. Although
wikis and blogs are common examples of second-generation websites, the most
feature-laden applications consist of social networking platforms. Users of these
systems construct online social networks through the use of voluntarily initiated
social ties. As opposed to bulletin boards and chat rooms, online social networking
sites make the relationships between users explicit, visible, and computable.
Current PHR offerings such as Google Health and Microsoft HealthVault al-

14

See J.S. Kahn, V. Aulakh, and A. Bosworth, “What it Takes: Characteristics of the
Ideal Personal Health Record” (2009) 28:2 Health Affairs 369.
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low consumers to grant access permissions to health care providers and family
members, typically by sending an “invite” to an email address. As a result, the first
generation of PHR systems can be said to have rudimentary social networking capabilities. However, some websites (e.g., PatientsLikeMe) go far beyond the basics,
by providing a full suite of collaboration and networking tools. From descriptions
of products on the horizon, it seems safe to assume that PHR systems will generally
incorporate features from the social networking domain. Although this trend
promises to enrich the user experience, it comes with a price; as discussed below,
PHR systems that incorporate social networking features also inherit the privacy
and security risks associated with them.
Lastly, social networking does not merely provide benefits for patients. Health
care providers can also take advantage of the collaborative nature of social
networking approaches, establishing virtual communities in which practitioners can
share advice, research results, and best practices.15 For example, Medting.com is an
application that permits physicians to share medical images and videos, get advice
from peers, discuss cases, rate and recommend cases and retrieve relevant professional publications from sources such as pubmed. Another example is the DocPatients network at Doctations.com, which provides an online community to facilitate
participation of patients in provider eHealth processes.

(d) PHR versus EHR systems
In order to clarify the regulatory environment governing patient management
systems, it is important to distinguish EHR from PHR systems. This section introduces some basic concepts from the academic and industrial literature.
In an influential document, the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) defined
an EHR as:
. . . a longitudinal collection of personal health information of a single individual, entered or accepted by health care providers, and stored electronically. The record may be made available at any time to providers, who have
been authorized by the individual, as a tool in the provision of health services. The individual has access to the record and can request changes to its
content. The transmission and storage of the content is under strict
security.16

The CMA definition coheres well with those offered by the academic community. According to various researchers, EHR systems are typically (1) complete,
integrating information from all health providers that treat the individual; (2) lifelong, storing information over the course of an individual’s life; (3) accessible,

15
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See M.N. Kamel Boulos and S. Wheeler, “The emerging Web 2.0 social software: an
enabling suite of sociable technologies in health and health care education” (2007) 24
Health Information and Libraries Journal 2.
Canadian Medical Association, “Advancing Electronic Health Records in Canada” CMA Working Principles and Recommendations Discussion Paper (2002).
Although not present in the CMA’s definition, Canadian EHRs are managed by
governmental ministries or agencies. Access to these systems is typically tightly
controlled through the use of access permissions and rigorous contractual
arrangements.
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available to a variety of professionals in various geographical areas, and; (4) secure, protected against unauthorized access.17
Although PHR systems are designed to meet these same conditions, there are
some important differences. First, EHR systems (and EMR systems in clinics or
hospitals) are typically used for a variety of functions; health information in these
systems may be used for clinical work, teaching, research, and process improvement. In addition to health care providers, individuals conducting audits, accreditation, and qualification reviews may access data in the EHR.18 In contrast, data residing in a PHR may not be available for these purposes, since access requires
explicit consent from the record owner.19 Second, EHRs contain various institutional work products, such as physician’s notes and administrative data. The release
of this information to patients is generally resisted by health care practitioners.
Third, health data in an EHR is supplied by professionals, whereas health data in a
PHR can come from non-professional sources, including the patient herself.
Fourth, an EHR is typically managed by a government agency or health authority,
whereas PHR systems can be provided by Internet service providers or software
vendors such as Microsoft or Google. Fifth, access to patient information in a PHR
is granted not through the use of organizational level agreements, but by the explicit consent of the patient.
On account of these differences, it is clear that PHR and EHR systems are not
synonymous. The main consequence of this conclusion is regulations and standards
for EHRs may not be relevant to PHR systems.

II. ISSUES WITH PHR SYSTEMS
PHR systems raise a number of interesting issues concerning privacy, security,
trust, integration, and interoperability. This section introduces some of the risks that
arise under each of these headings, in order to provide background for the discussion to follow.
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to review some of the unique aspects of
information management in the health care domain. First, PHI is arguably among
the most sensitive types of information. In contrast to other types of sensitive information (e.g., financial information) individuals cannot easily be indemnified with
respect to unauthorized disclosure of their personal health information. This type of
information also has high value to many third parties, including insurers, employers, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, and public health agencies. Second, in
contrast to many other application domains, the relationships of actors participating

17

18
19

See N. Terry and L. Francis, “Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic
Health Records” (2007) 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 681. Of course, real-world systems may
fail to satisfy one or more of these conditions at any given time.
See L.E. Rozovsky and N.J. Inions, Canadian Health Information, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 2002) at 7.
This constraint prevents PHRs from serving as a source of information for reporting to
governments and other public bodies tasked with managing the health care system.
However, some current PHR service providers reserve the right to use the data for
other purposes. As an example, PatientsLikeMe shares information with corporate
partners.
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in the health care of an individual are ephemeral, since health care teams coalesce
around episodes of care. Third, the inquiries that an individual makes about health
conditions can give outsiders information about that individual’s health status.
Fourth, since health conditions are often hereditary, information about a patient’s
ailments or health concerns can facilitate the inference of information about their
family members.

(a) Privacy and Security
From one perspective, privacy and confidentiality issues may actually be less
intense in PHR systems than in the traditional medical records settings. For instance, a major hospital may hold records on hundreds of thousands of patients,
each of which is accessible to a wide variety of health care professionals and administrators. In the absence of strong access control mechanisms (to prevent unauthorized users accessing data) and auditing (to prevent authorized users from misusing their privileges), PHI in a medical records system is readily available to
hospital employees. In contrast, within the PHR context a patient must explicitly
grant permission to allow another actor to view a portion of her health record; the
information in the record is ostensibly within the full control of the patient.
Despite this initial impression, significant privacy and security concerns arise
within the PHR context. While health care providers are typically bound by various
legal instruments that impose constraints on the collection, use and disclosure of
PHI, an operator of a PHR may not have the same obligations. Given the value of
health information to third parties, most vendors will be faced with an incentive to
disclose the information, either by bulk data extracts or by allowing access to the
data repository. PHR operators may release personal information to a variety of
data recipients, including marketers, employers and insurance companies.20
Since many online PHR systems are delivered as hosted services, the physical
location of the site’s servers is not always clear. Site operators may sell, transfer, or
sub-contract their operations, sometimes resulting in a change in the legal jurisdiction where the data resides.21 Even more ominously, cloud computing approaches
can result in data being scattered and duplicated across numerous jurisdictions.22
This state of affairs raises a number of issues. First, in some of these regions, privacy protections may be lacking. For instance, the provisions of the United States

20

21

22

As an example of third party access, there is recent evidence of increased data requests
from social networking sites by government agencies. For an example, see R. Lardner,
“Break the law and your new ‘friend’ may be the FBI” Associated Press, (16 March
2010).
Another interesting issue that arises with respect to the PHR concerns the legal status
of the PHR’s contents from the standpoint of documentary evidence. A discussion of
this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records as
Documentary Evidence”, (2007) 6 C.J.L.T. 141 for a relatively recent treatment of the
general difficulties surrounding Canada’s approach to electronic documents in this
context.
See Brian Hayes, “Cloud computing” (2008) 51:7 Communications of the ACM 9.
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Patriot Act23 raise particular risks for the confidentiality of PHI, as that statute prohibits a vendor from telling users that their data has been accessed by governmental
agencies. Second, cloud computing approaches have a number of security implications. Not only do virtualized cloud environments raise the risks of security issues,
but the fact that the infrastructure is dynamic and distributed makes it difficult for
vendors or health care providers to perform assurance, risk assessment, or testing
activities. Third, users typically have no control over retention periods for PHI or
associated metadata. Even if deleted from the repository, duplicate images and
backups can exist in any of the multiple jurisdictions in which the data was stored.
While governments and health care providers are typically subject to obligations concerning the accuracy of PHI stored in their medical record systems, PHR
vendors may not be faced with similar responsibilities. In some sense, the fact that
patients manage their own information in the PHR vitiates the relevance of the
accuracy obligations that frequently are assigned to health care providers. However, the presence of defects in the PHR software may result in a loss of data integrity — a situation that could prove onerous should the data be relied upon for the
provisioning of health services.
If social networking features are included in a PHR system, additional security
and privacy issues arise. First, social computing applications allow for complex
usage scenarios. This complexity can create problems for users who are trying to
assess the risks associated with sharing data. In addition, the added complexity
makes it difficult to draft accurate and comprehensive privacy policies.24 Second,
the ease with which network formation is accomplished means that social networks
are often more expansive than one might expect, leading users to misjudge their
actual exposure.25 Third, there is evidence that leakage of personal information to
third party servers and applications occurs in many social networking applications.26 In particular, social networking systems often make use of third party advertising servers, which receive personal information about users in order to provide targeted advertising. Since a small group of companies has captured a large
share of the market, the providers of these services are often in a position to aggregate data drawn from multiple websites.
Lastly, the use of PHR to store personal information leads to a problem regarding legal recourse in the case of misuse, unauthorized disclosure or loss of
integrity. Unlike financial losses, incidents involving PHI are difficult to value; the
lack of even vague estimates on the value of misused PHI means that it is difficult
23

24

25

26

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
See H.M. Kienle, A. Lober, and H.A. Muller, “Policy and Legal Challenges of Virtual
Worlds and Social Network Sites” eprint arXiv:0808.1343 (9 August 2008) online:
<http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0808/0808.1343v1.pdf>.
See R. Gross, A. Acquisti, and H.J. Heinz, “Information revelation and privacy in online social networks” (2005) Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in
the Electronic Society WPES ’05 71.
See B. Krishnamurthy and C. Wills, “On the leakage of Personally Identifiable Information
Via
Online
Social
Networks”
(2009)
WOSN,
online:
<http://www2.research.att.com/~bala/papers/wosn09.pdf>.
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to assess damages. The same difficulties in valuation make privacy breaches difficult to indemnify, as evidenced by the general lack of insurance products for this
type of loss.

(b) Trust
In addition to issues concerning privacy and security, PHR systems demonstrate some notable challenges in the area of trust. First, and most obviously, there
are several issues that arise with respect to trust from a user perspective. For instance, if a user adds a care provider such as a physician or occupational therapist
to her care team, she trusts that the user account corresponding to the care provider
is actually owned by someone licensed to practise medicine. Indeed, there is a possibility for duplicitous individuals or companies to create fake accounts on PHR
systems, in order to eavesdrop, obtain data from patients, or provide suggestions on
treatments. Current policies to verify the authenticity and credentials of professional caregivers range from simply clicking a button in order to “attest” to be a
licenced physician (e.g., Medting.com) up to requiring a licence registration number, which is then cross-checked with the medical association that issued it (e.g.,
the CMA’s Asklepios.ca).
Moreover, users need to trust that the recommendations provided by online
care providers are unbiased by commercial interests or, at the very least, that any
potential bias has been disclosed to them. The Health on the Net (HON) foundation
has developed a code of ethical conduct and a certification process for addressing
this issue (HONcode). Online care providers can apply for an HONcode certificate,
which they can publish on their profiles.
In addition to these issues, there is a larger concern about the trustworthiness
of the information contained in a PHR. A recent survey of Chief Executive Officers
of Canadian acute care hospitals indicated that patient literacy was considered a
very important barrier for the introduction of patient-accessible electronic health
records.27 There is a widespread perception that health data entered by patients
cannot be relied upon. Kim et al. conclude that this is of particular concern in those
target demographics that would most benefit from Internet-based health services,
e.g., elderly patients with low income.28 Empirical studies have shown that the accuracy of patient-entered data varies based on the type of the information provided,
and the format it is provided in.29
Moreover, the provenance of the information entered has shown to be an important indicator for its trustworthiness. For example, patients entering laboratory
information from a primary source (printed lab report, hand written note, or mem-

27
28
29

S. Urowitz et al. “Is Canada ready for patient accessible electronic health records? A
national scan” (2008) 8:33 BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making.
E. H. Kim et al. “Challenges to using an electronic personal health record by a lowincome elderly population” (2009) 11:4 Journal of Medical Internet Research e44.
See M. I. Kim and K. B. Johnson, “Patient entry of information: evaluation of user
interfaces” (2004) 6:2 Journal of Medical Internet Research e13. For example, information about diagnoses provided in text form proved to be quite accurate, while information about therapy goals (free text or selected from a predefined list) proved to be less
accurate.
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ory recollections) generate information with different levels of trustworthiness. The
PHR may also require the user to “translate” or “abstract” the raw laboratory data
contained on the lab report in order to fit it in the patient record. The level of guidance on these abstraction steps provided by the PHR influences the trustworthiness of the entered data.
Finally, PHRs may contain data that was uploaded directly from a laboratory
of a professional care provider. However, without information about the provenance of this information, this data may be indistinguishable from patient-provided
information. The inclusion and maintenance of “meta health data” (i.e., data about
the context of the actual health data) in PHR applications may be a partial answer
to this problem. Standards for representing such meta data have been developed by
organizations such as Health Level 7 and OpenEHR. However, few current PHR
systems make use of them.

(c) Integration and Interchange
If a PHR system is used merely as a patient-managed record of health information, (as in the isolated PHR scenario), integration with health care provider business processes and information systems is straightforward. In this case, the patient
can print out information, upload diagnostic reports, and grant access to physicians
via a hosted, online interface. Issues of trust and provenance apply, but the health
care provider does not need to worry about integrating their technical systems with
the PHR.
In contrast, a range of issues arise when a PHR is used as a data sink or data
source. In the data source scenario, health authorities and hospitals may have standards or guidelines concerning minimum thresholds for data quality. In the data
sink scenario, most health care providers in Canada manage the risks involved in
sharing PHI with other entities through the use of information sharing agreements.30 Since many PHR vendors are a) not health care providers, and b) likely
located in other legal jurisdictions, drafting agreements for data sharing with PHR
systems is likely to be more complicated. Some health authorities may also be concerned about the workload involved in accommodating PHR systems within their
business practices.
Even if the appropriate contractual provisions are in place, interchange of data
requires that the health care provider’s information systems communicate with the
PHR. In the almost certain absence of a shared data model, the two systems require
a means of exchanging information that allows transformation of the data, while
preserving the semantics. Such messaging middleware exists, but is not particularly
widespread in Canada.
Putting aside concerns about interoperability between the information systems
of health care providers and the PHR, there is an additional interoperability issue — namely, the ease with which information may be transferred between competing PHRs. If PHRs are analogous to social networking applications, the costs of
switching providers are quite high. A user who is thinking of switching to a competing PHR system is faced with the daunting task of migrating their personal information. If this is a manual process, the effort could be substantial, yielding a

30

Also known as “personal information transfer agreements.”
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disincentive for patients to change, even in the face of questionable security and
privacy practices.

III. THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE IN CANADA
(a) Overview
The provision of health care in Canada is generally a joint responsibility between the federal and provincial governments, as it is not an enumerated category
within the division of powers listed in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act,
1867.31 As a result, both levels of government may pass legislation concerning
health. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, “Health is not a matter which
is subject to specific constitutional assignment but instead is an amorphous topic
which can be addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in the
circumstances of each case on the nature and scope of the health problem in question.”32 In practice, the precise boundary of federal and provincial authority over
health care has been contested, and is not capable of being summarized in the present work.33
In terms of the practical distribution of responsibilities, the provincial governments generally have authority over the administration of health care organizations,
including hospitals, laboratories and long-term care facilities. In addition to providing (partial) funding for provincial health care, the federal government takes responsibility for a number of programs and legislative instruments. Several federal
statutes relate to public health concerns, including the Quarantine Act34, the Hazardous Products Act35 and the Food and Drugs Act.36 The federal government also
has authority over First Nations groups, under subsection 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867. While Health Canada provides primary health care to hundreds of First
Nations communities, the federal government also provides transfer payments as a
means of fulfilling its responsibilities.
At the provincial level, Legislatures have passed statutes aimed at regulating
health care providers, including hospitals, self-regulating professions, mental health
facilities, ambulance services, and provincial insurance programs. Many of these
organizations have also promulgated bylaws or codes of conduct that are binding
upon their employees or members. Lastly, common law judgments have not only
created non-statutory law, but have provided interpretations of key provisions and
terms in the various instruments.
The following subsections introduce a subset of the instruments that are relevant to health information management — namely, privacy statutes, health infor-

31
32
33
34
35
36

(U.K.), 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.5.
Schneider v. British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112 at 142 (S.C.C.).
For a discussion, see Martha Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction over Health in Canada” (2000) 8 Health L.J. 95.
R.S.C. 1985 c. Q-1 / S.C. 2005, c. 20.
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-3.
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27. For a discussion of various federal statutes, see Tracy M. Bailey,
Timothy Caulfield, and Nola M. Ries, Public Health Law and Policy in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 12.
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mation statutes, medical device regulations, and industry-promulgated standards.

(b) Privacy Statutes
(i) Background
The protection of privacy in Canada arises from a patchwork of statutes, regulations, bylaws, judicial/administrative decisions, codes of conduct, and industry
standards. With respect to data protection law, the most relevant instruments are the
various privacy statutes; there are no less than 23 privacy statutes in Canada, some
of which are devoted exclusively to the protection of health information. In general,
the Canadian statutes take their inspiration from a set of “fair information practices” first developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In response to Canada becoming a signatory to the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data,37 the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) promulgated the Model Code
for the Protection of Personal Information in 1996.38 While the federal government
had already passed a privacy statute binding on federal public bodies,39 the development of a statute for the private sector was given impetus by a directive of the
European Union40 that prohibited member states from transferring data to jurisdictions with inadequate privacy protection.
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act41
(PIPEDA) is a federal statute that applies to private sector organizations. PIPEDA
was originally described as a means for enhancing consumer confidence in electronic commerce applications, by means of protecting the personal information involved in transactions. Despite the focus on electronic commerce, the scope of the
legislation is much more expansive than this narrow description implies. PIPEDA
contains provisions that regulate the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a wide variety of additional contexts. Lastly the statute explicitly incorporates the CSA Model Code in the form of a schedule (Schedule 1) that lays
out 10 fair information principles.

(ii) Applicability
In terms of applicability, subsection 4(1) of PIPEDA makes it clear that the
statute applies to every organization in respect of personal information that (a) “the
organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial activities”, or;
(b) “is about an employee of the organization and that the organization collects,
uses or discloses in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or

37
38
39
40

41

(23 September 1980) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Standards Council of Canada, CAN/CSA-Q830-96 [Model Code].
The federal Privacy Act came into force on July 1, 1983.
Directives E.C., “On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data” [24 October 1995] O.J. L.
95/46.
S.C. 2000, c.5.
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business”.42 Since PHR systems like HealthVault and Google Health are not related to federal works, undertakings or businesses,43 applying PIPEDA to these services involves an examination of whether the vendor organization qualifies as an
“organization that collects, uses or discloses personal information in the course of
conducting commercial activities.” The following subsections explicate some of the
concepts that appear in this provision.

(A) Personal Information
Subsection 2(1) of PIPEDA states that the term “personal information” means
“information about an identifiable individual.”44 The key concept at work in this
definition is that information is personal if it can be traced back to an individual by
a third party. The definition is expansive, in that it allows a wide variety of information to count as personal; in particular, third parties may be possessed of background knowledge — information that provides enough context to make the identification of the individual feasible.45
Information contained within PHR systems typically includes demographic information, as well as different types of health information. Due to the presence of
the former, it would be quite likely than a third party coming into possession of the

42

43

44

45

In addition, Section 4(2)b of PIPEDA states that the privacy regulations contained in its
first Part do not apply to “any individual in respect of personal information that the
individual collects, uses or discloses for personal or domestic purposes and does not
collect, use or disclose for any other purpose”. At first glance, condition (a) of Subsection 4(1) may appear to be ultra vires, as the Constitution Act, 1867 assigned to provincial governments the ability to pass laws related to property and civil rights. However,
the federal government was assigned the power to regulate trade and commerce. A
detailed analysis of these issues is found in W. Charnetsky, P. Flaherty, and J. Robinson, The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: A Comprehensive Guide, (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2001). At present, it suffices to remark that
the federal government has some authority to regulate interprovincial and international
trade and commerce, as well as trade which affects the whole nation. It is those powers
which ground the federal government’s claim that PIPEDA applies to transactions
across international or provincial borders.
The question as to whether pan-Canadian health records systems could conceivably
qualify as federal works, undertakings, or businesses for the purpose of PIPEDA is not
considered in this paper.
The name, title, business address, and telephone number of an employee of an organization are expressly excluded from this category, thereby providing employers with the
ability to disseminate workplace contact information freely.
As an example, a patient’s provincial medical insurance number readily allows a third
party to identify an individual, since there is a one-to-one mapping between it and the
set of Canadian citizens. On the other hand, a patient’s date of birth and surname may
only give a third party a probabilistic inference as to the identity of the individual, since
more than one person may have the same surname and birth date. If the third party
comes into possession of a second database that includes dates of birth, surnames and
postal codes, the probability of identifying the patient is increased.
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contents of a PHR record could identify the individual to whom it belongs.46 As a
result, the contents of the PHR will generally count as personal information under
PIPEDA. There are ways, however, for vendors to avoid this conclusion. If the data
in the PHR is encrypted, a third party (lacking the decryption key) would be unable
to make any sense of the contents.47 PHR architectures that provide encryption
against the platform are a subject of current research; given the existing literature, it
would not be surprising to see reference architectures emerge within the next five
years.48

(B) Organization
Subsection 2(1) of PIPEDA defines an “organization” to include “an association, a partnership, a person and a trade union.” Given the interpretative strictures
contained in subsections 33(1) and 35(1) of the Interpretation Act,49 the definition
of an organization therefore covers corporate entities, including non-profit societies. This is a fortuitous development from a regulatory perspective, as many vendors of PHR applications are corporations (e.g., Google) and non-profits (e.g., PatientsLikeMe).50 On this front, the Privacy Commissioner has stated that the legal
nature of an organization is not determinative of whether it is bound by PIPEDA. In
particular, a non-profit organization may still be caught, as the following excerpt

46

47

48

49
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Unfortunately, the type of binary distinction between “identifiability” and “non-identifiability” endorsed by modern privacy law has major deficiencies when applied to
datasets. One of the problems is that the background knowledge of a third party is not
restricted in any way. As a simple example, I may happen upon a piece of paper which
gives blood pressure readings for a particular date (yesterday). In the absence of other
knowledge, I cannot locate the patient based on the blood pressure reading alone. However, imagine that I live in a small town. While in a coffee shop I overheard someone
describe the results of yesterday’s blood pressure check at the local clinic. Assuming
the results match those that I found on the piece of paper, I am certainly justified in
inferring that I have found the owner of the record. However, absent that serendipity, I
would have a hard time making any inferences. The fact that PIPEDA allows the “identifiability” of the record to be determined by such slim possibilities is a deficiency in
the law.
Technically, the third party could conduct one of several forms of attacks, one of which
would involve attempting to ascertain the key. In general, it is not possible to guarantee
that the attacker cannot succeed.
Partial solutions to this issue have been provided in the context of social networking
applications by a number of authors, including M. M. Lucas and N. Borisov, “FlyByNight: mitigating the privacy risks of social networking” (2008) Proceedings of the 7th
ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society WPES 08 1.
R.S.C. 1985 c. I-21. For instance, subsection 35(1) states that the word “person”, or
any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation.
Even if a vendor is a private sector corporation, the rationale for offering PHR services
can vary. For instance, Google and Microsoft have different financial strategies underlying their offerings. For a discussion, see P.C. Tang and T.H. Lee, “Your doctor’s
office or the Internet? Two paths to personal health records” (2009) 360:13 The New
England Journal of Medicine 1276.
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demonstrates:
The first matter to address is that of jurisdiction. [The Law School Admission Council] contends that it is not engaged in any commercial activities
for the purpose of [PIPEDA]. In support of this position, LSAC relies on
“its status as a non-profit, non-stock organization, its membership and governance structure and the public policy aspect in providing an educationrelated mechanism to assess individuals seeking to enter a regulated profession to practice law.”51
LSAC’s status as a non-profit, non-stock, membership-based organization is
not determinative. [PIPEDA] applies to organizations, defined in section 2
as including “an association, a partnership, a person and a trade union.”
There is no exemption for non-profit or member-oriented organizations. To
the contrary, the definition of “commercial activity,” namely, “any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a
commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor,
membership or other fundraising lists,” makes clear Parliament’s intention
that the Act apply to commercial transactions that non-profit, membershipbased organizations might engage in.

As a result of this reasoning, both corporate and non-profit providers of PHR
services can qualify as organizations within the context of PIPEDA. Subsection
4(1) makes it clear, however, that not every organization collecting personal information is caught by the statute; only organizations that collect, use, or disclose
personal information in the course of conducting commercial activities are subject
to PIPEDA.

(C) Collection, Use, Disclosure
It is not clear that PHR vendors will necessarily collect, use, or disclose personal information. Recalling the four PHR scenarios outlined above, an isolated
PHR system is a mere repository of information, where data exchange is performed
manually by the account holder. Patients upload information, and have exclusive
control over what is subsequently accessed. In such a case, the basic processes of
data management are completely different from organizations such as hospitals,
marketing agencies or worker’s compensation boards. In the words of the Privacy
Commissioner, commenting on a similar issue with respect to social networking
sites:
The purpose of the Act is to balance an organization’s need to collect, use
and disclose personal information for appropriate purposes with the individual’s right to privacy vis-à-vis their personal information. In the off-line
world, organizations may collect particular personal information, and use
and disclose such personal information, in order to provide a specific service. On Facebook, users decide what information they provide in order to
meet their own needs for social networking.52

From a user perspective, entry of data into a PHR system is either accomplished by the patient herself, or (in a data sink approach) by a health care provider.

51
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PIPEDA Case Summary #2008-389 (Report of Findings).
Supra note 7.
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The vendor of the PHR system does not play a role in actually collecting data. In
addition, it is not clear that every PHR vendor will use or disclose data. While it is
true that some websites (e.g., PatientsLikeMe) disclose information to commercial
partners, it is not necessarily the case that PHR vendors intend to use or disclose
PHI in such a manner.53 The determination of whether a PHR vendor is “using” or
“disclosing” for purposes of PIPEDA seems to be contingent, and impossible to
specify a priori.

(D) Commercial Activities
The last task remaining in our application of clause 4.1(a) to PHR vendors
involves a determination of whether they are engaged in “commercial activities”.
Subsection 2(1) of PIPEDA defines this term (perhaps unhelpfully) as “any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, membership or
other fundraising lists”. As stated by the Commissioner in a recent speech, the moment a PHR or social networking application vendor uses information for commercial purposes, the law applies and the organization becomes responsible for safeguarding the data.54
As detailed above, a non-profit agency can engage in commercial activities.
Conversely, one might wonder about the implications of for-profit business entities
engaging in non-profit activities, such as hosting PHR systems. A recent report by
the Commissioner on Facebook reveals a surprisingly expansive view of the activities that count as commercial:
[P]ersonal information posted by individuals for purely personal purposes
that would otherwise be exempted under the Act does fall under the Act and
imposes obligations on Facebook to the extent that Facebook uses such personal information in the course of commercial activities. There is no conflict
between the same information being both for personal purposes and commercial purposes.
...
It is reasonable to assume that those features of the site that do not have an
obvious link to its business model are included to enhance the user’s experience on Facebook. Enhancing the experience likely encourages existing
members to continue to use the site and presumably encourages others to
join as well — thereby indirectly contributing to the success of Facebook as
a commercial enterprise. In that sense, collection, use and disclosure of personal information in relation to a feature without an apparent direct commercial link can still be characterized as occurring “in the course of com-

53

54

As we noted in the section on privacy and security issues, the temptation to use or
disclose PHI may be quite strong. Despite the bona fide intentions of an organization,
unauthorized use and disclosure remains a security and privacy risk.
“Facebook users themselves are the ones who decide what information they are willing
to post on the site to carry out their social networking. That information in itself does
not fall under PIPEDA”. J. Stoddart, “When Everyone and Their Mother is a Content
Provider: The Principle of Privacsy at the Heart of the Social Revolution” (2010) Remarks at the CRIM Crystal Ball Conference.
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mercial activity” in the sense required under the Act.55

Given this decision, as well as the purposive approach to statutory interpretation urged by the Supreme Court,56 it does not seem far-fetched to assume that the
Commissioner would likely view a non-profit PHR initiative from a for-profit vendor as constituting “commercial activity” within the sense required by PIPEDA.

(E) Jurisdiction and Online Services
It is likely that Canadians using PHR systems will be transmitting data across
jurisdictional boundaries. As mentioned above, the division of powers can be invoked to argue that PIPEDA should apply to interprovincial and international flows
of information. Both administrative decisions and federal court jurisprudence are in
consonance with this approach.
Canadian jurisprudence on the jurisdictional reach of the provincial courts is
typically attributed to Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye,57 in which the Supreme Court was tasked with adjudicating a dispute over whether a court in British
Columbia could recognize and enforce decisions from a court in Alberta. The majority decided that courts in a province may recognize and enforce judicial decisions made by courts in a different province, provided the latter properly (or appropriately) exercised jurisdiction. In order to aid with this determination, the court
introduced a test for the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction, by which there must be
a “real and substantial connection” between the jurisdiction and the issue in
question.
Subsequent cases have extended the decision in Morguard. In Beals v.
Saldanha,58 the court concluded that the Morguard principles should be extended
beyond interprovincial scenarios, so that the “real and substantial connection” test
should also apply to the enforcement of foreign judgments. In Disney Enterprises
Inc. v. Click Enterprises Inc.,59 the court considered the case of an Ontario-based
online content provider taken to court in New York. In the course of deciding that
the Ontario courts could enforce the damage award set by the US court, (which had
exercised proper jurisdiction), Justice Lax stated that the determination of the
proper exercise of jurisdiction by a court depends on two principles: the need for
order and fairness and the existence of a real and substantial connection to either
the cause of action or the defendant. The first principle is met in a case involving
multiple jurisdictions when there are “reasonable grounds for assuming jurisdiction”. In particular, Justice Lax noted that the jurisprudence in Canada supports the
view that there is sufficient connection for a foreign court to take jurisdiction where
Canada is the “country of transmission or origin.”
Lastly, the federal court has explicitly considered the issue of whether the fed-
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Supra note 7.
See, for example, Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.).
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 217, 52 B.C.L.R. (2d)
160 (S.C.C.).
2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.).
(2006), 267 D.L.R. (4th) 291, 49 C.P.R. (4th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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eral privacy commissioner has jurisdiction to investigate complaints concerning
privacy issues arising from cross-border information flows. Lawson v. Accussearch
Inc.60 was an application for judicial review of a decision by the commissioner to
the effect that she did not have jurisdiction to investigate issues pertaining to crossborder information flows, as any investigation would require the use of her powers
extra-territorially. The court held that although Parliament had not intended for the
commissioner to act extraterritorially, PIPEDA could apply where the dispute was
“sufficiently connected to Canada to ground the exercise of Canadian jurisdiction”.
Simply put, the fact that a given vendor or service provider is located in a
foreign jurisdiction will not exempt it from the scope of the law. In Lawson, the
federal court held that PIPEDA could still apply to foreign entities that either receive or transmit communications to or from Canada, and that collect or disclose
information about individuals in Canada. The success of the Commissioner’s investigation of Facebook was ample demonstration that PIPEDA can apply to the commercial collection, use and disclosure of personal information by foreign entities
operating in cyberspace.
Despite the decision in Lawson, Canadian regulatory authorities can only
bring their weight to bear on threats that they are made aware of. In addition to
issues of monitoring, whistleblower protection and feedback mechanisms, a major
issue in the design of regulatory systems consists of statutes that prevent data custodians from alerting their stakeholders about access requests by government agencies. For example, Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia
conducted an extensive investigation into the Patriot Act, in response to concerns
that Canadian subsidiaries of US companies could be compelled to (silently) hand
over the personal information of British Columbians.61 The final report states that
in the absence of appropriate (American) safeguards concerning requests for information by US authorities, it is prudent to assume that a) US authorities are unfettered in their ability to seek an order for disclosure of records pertaining to Canadians, and; b) they may do so in circumstances that are not consistent with Canadian
law and policy. While the report contained 16 concrete recommendations for the
British Columbia government, it mentioned that the Patriot Act is “also an issue for
the private sector and will have to be addressed by all jurisdictions across Canada
and at an international level.”62

(iii) Implications
The analysis above leads us to conclude that many PHR vendors will be subject to PIPEDA. Despite this result, there are some challenges in applying that statute to PHR systems. PIPEDA was clearly not designed to cover information systems in which individuals manage their own information, engaging in selective and
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2007 FC 125, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 314 (F.C.).
Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Implications for British Columbia Public Sector Outsourcing (2004), online:
<http://oipc.bc.ca/sector_public/archives/usa_patriot_act/pdfs/report/privacyfinal%20summary.pdf>.
Supra note 61 at 18.
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voluntary disclosure to third parties.63
First, PIPEDA contains a host of provisions and guidelines surrounding the
collection of personal information (PI). Both subsection 7(1) and the Schedule 1
“Consent” principle impose restrictions on the ability of organizations to collect PI
without knowledge and consent. The “Identifying Purposes” principle states that
the purposes for which PI is collected shall be identified at or before the time of
collection. Lastly, the “Limiting Collection” principle dictates that organizations
may only collect the minimal amount of PI necessary to fulfill these explicitly
stated purposes. Given that PHR systems involve patients voluntarily contributing
PI and PHI, the constraints enumerated above are largely irrelevant.64
Second, many of the remaining PIPEDA principles are of questionable utility
when applied to PHR systems. The “Access” and “Accuracy” principles do not
appear to be relevant, while the “Openness” and “Challenging Compliance” principles impose easily discharged burdens on vendors. Retention periods are mentioned
in the model code, but the organization is allowed to determine guidelines and procedures (and presumably any retention periods not mandated by other legal instruments). Lastly, the fact that PIPEDA lacks breach notification requirements means
that vendors are not under a general duty to warn users of privacy breaches.
Despite these difficulties, PHR systems do not evade PIPEDA’s reach entirely. First, the “Safeguards” principle holds that information shall be protected by
“security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.” In particular,
the safeguards must protect against loss or theft, as well as unauthorized access,
disclosure, copying, use or modification. The nature of the protection should include (a) physical measures, (b) organizational measures, and (c) technological
measures. The principle also dictates that employees of an organization receive
training concerning confidentiality, and that care shall be used in the disposal or
destruction of data.
Second, PIPEDA does contain provisions that could be used to limit the use
and disclosure of information stored in PHR systems:
•
The “Limiting Use, Disclosure and Retention” principle specifies that
personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other
than those for which it was collected, except with consent or where re-
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PIPEDA, s. 3 states that the aim of the statute is to establish
rules to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals
with respect to their personal information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that
a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.
It is by no means clear that PHR vendors have a need to collect, use or disclose any
personal information at all.
As noted in S. Perrin et al., The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: An Annotated Guide, (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc. 2001), data protection legislation aims at providing individuals with a legal right to control the collection, use, and
disclosure of their personal information. The most important stage in a business process is therefore the collection of information, as it becomes more difficult to exert
control once the data have been collected.
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quired by law. Information may only be retained as long as necessary for
the fulfillment of those purposes; information that is no longer required to
fulfill these purposes should be destroyed, erased or made anonymous.
The “Identifying Purposes” principle’s clause 4.2.4 states “when personal
information that has been collected is to be used for a purpose not previously identified, the new purpose shall be identified prior to use. Unless
the new purpose is required by law, the consent of the individual is required before information can be used for that purpose.”

Although one could argue that information in a PHR has not been “collected,”
a purposive interpretation would likely accommodate PHR vendors within the
scope of these principles. Subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA also provides a purposive
limitation, as it states that “[a]n organization may collect, use or disclose personal
information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances.” The test for appropriate purposes is therefore contextual and objective, providing some impartiality for claimants wishing to dispute
information management practices.65
In addition, the “Consent” principle states that “[t]he knowledge and consent
of the individual are required for the collection, use or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate.” As pointed out by Perrin et al.66, the phrase
“except where inappropriate” does not lend itself well to statutory interpretation.
As a result, the drafters of PIPEDA introduced three lists in subsections 7(1), 7(2)
and 7(3) that are intended to provide an exhaustive list of cases where it would be
inappropriate to obtain knowledge and consent. Of these exceptions, the most salient consist of use and disclosure for research purposes. However, such use or disclosure is only permitted if certain conditions are met, providing patients with some
assurance that their information will not be accessed by researchers in an ad hoc
fashion.67
Third, the PIPEDA principles impose certain administrative obligations on
PHR vendors. Clause 4.9.1 of the “Individual Access” principles provides individuals with a right to request an account of the uses that have been made their information, as well as an account of the third parties to which it has been disclosed. Clause
4.1.3 of the “Accountability” principle mandates that PHR vendors use “contractual
or other means” to provide a comparable level of protection when information is
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From the Commissioner’s findings, it appears as though the test for appropriate purposes is evolving to include a series of questions similar to those involved in R. v.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). As an example, in PIPEDA Case Summary
#2006-351 the Assistant Commissioner considered the following questions in determining the appropriateness issue:
1. Is the measure demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need?
2. Is it likely to be effective in meeting that need?
3. Is the loss of privacy proportional to the benefit gained?
4. Is there a less privacy-invasive way of achieving the same end?
Supra note 64.
A full discussion of this exception is beyond the scope of this paper.
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sent to third parties for processing. Clause 4.1.4 of the same principle obligates
vendors to implement procedures to protect personal information.
The most unique provision from the standpoint of PHR systems is subsection
9(1), which states that an organization must not give an individual access to personal information if doing so would likely reveal personal information about a third
party. The same provision goes on to state that if the information about the third
party is severable from the record containing the information about the individual,
the organization must sever the information about the third party before giving the
individual access. As mentioned above, the hereditary nature of many conditions
entails that third parties can often receive information on individuals by obtaining
knowledge of health conditions of their family members.

(c) Health Information Statutes
(i) Background
Certain provinces have devised statutes and regulations specific to health information. Typically, these instruments seek to maintain coherence with fair information practices, while accounting for the unique demands of the health care domain. Since Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act68 (PHIPA) is a
well-known example of a health information statute, it will ground the discussion
below.
PHIPA is designed to protect patients by imposing constraints on the collection, use, and disclosure of PHI. In large part, the development of the statute was
prompted by a desire on the part of health care providers to create a regulatory
regime that was tailored to the unique needs of the health care industry. As a result,
health providers in Ontario that are subject to PHIPA have received an explicit
exemption from the applicability of PIPEDA.69
PHIPA provides for a number of fair information practices. First, a patient has
a right to access their PHI, and to correct any information that is inaccurate. Second, organizations subject to PHIPA must be open about their information practices, and must inform patients of their ability to make complaints to both the organization itself, and to the Ontario Privacy Commissioner. Third, the statute
includes special procedures for consent, tailored to match the reality of health care
as an industry that relies upon relatively fluid and unpredictable exchanges of information between specialists. Fourth, the statute contains breach notification provisions that require organizations to inform a patient at the first reasonable opportunity if the patient’s information is compromised. Fifth, PHIPA requires
organizations to take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of PHI, and to ensure
that it is retained, transferred and disposed of in a secure manner.70
In terms of application, the weight of PHIPA generally falls on a set of health
care providers, referred to in the legislation as “health information custodians”, as
well as their agents. However, PHIPA also contains provisions for “providers,” per-
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S.O. 2004, c.3, Sch. A and its accompanying regulations O. Reg. 329/04.
S.O.R./2005-399, made under PIPEDA.
The five aforementioned principles are, of course, not the only ones enshrined in the
statute, and we will discuss additional issues in the sections to follow.
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sons who provide “goods or services for the purpose of enabling a health information custodian to use electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose, retain or
dispose of [PHI]”.71 A refinement of a provider is a “health information network
provider,” a “person who provides services to two or more health information custodians where the services are provided primarily to custodians to enable the custodians to use electronic means to disclose [PHI] to one another . . .”72

(ii) Applicability
Addressing the status of private sector PHR vendors under PHIPA involves
characterizing the role that vendors play in the management of health care information.73 As a starting point, subsection 7(1) states that PHIPA applies to the collection of PHI by a health information custodian, as well as the use or disclosure of
PHI by i) a health information custodian, or ii) a person who is not a health information custodian and to whom a health information custodian disclosed the information. A private sector organization that provided PHR services to residents of
Ontario would not qualify as a “health information custodian” under PHIPA, as
neither section 3 of PHIPA nor its accompanying regulations seem to support such
a claim. This is unfortunate for regulators, as many of the key provisions in PHIPA
attach exclusively to health information custodians.74
Despite the conclusion that PHR vendors do not appear to qualify as health
information custodians, they will be caught by subsection 7(1) if they are a person
to whom a health information custodian has disclosed PHI.75 Section 49 imposes
two obligations on such recipients of PHI. First, the recipient must not use or disclose the information for any purpose other than (a) the purpose for which the custodian was authorized to disclose the information under PHIPA, and (b) the purpose of carrying out a statutory or legal duty. Second, the recipient must not use or
disclose more of the information than is “reasonably necessary to meet the purpose
of the use or disclosure,” unless the use or disclosure is required by law.
In addition to treating a PHR vendor as a data recipient, a regulator attempting
to bring a PHR system within the ambit of PHIPA could attempt to characterize the
vendor as a person who provides “goods or services for the purpose of enabling a
health information custodian to use electronic means to collect, use, modify, dis-

71
72
73
74

75

PHIPA, s. 10(4).
O. Reg. 329/04, s. 6(2).
Due to space constraints, a discussion of public sector PHR initiatives is beyond the
scope of this paper.
For instance, section 10 requires health information custodians to follow PHIPA-compliant information practices. Subsection 11(1) requires a custodian to take reasonable
steps to ensure that PHI is accurate, complete and up-to-date as is necessary for the
purposes for which it uses the information. Subsection 12(1) requires custodians to take
steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that PHI in the custodian’s
custody or control is protected against theft, loss and unauthorized use or disclosure.
Under that provision, the custodian must also ensure that records containing the information are protected against unauthorized copying, modification, or disposal.
In our terminology, a PHR vendor will be caught by subsection 7(1) if the PHR is
following either the data sink or interoperable PHR models.
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close, retain or dispose of [PHI]”. Despite the initial appeal, it is not clear that PHR
vendors are providing a service by which custodians may store PHI in electronic
form, as opposed to providing a service by which patients may manage their own
health information.76 Even less promising is the claim that a PHR vendor is a
“health information network provider” under PHIPA — a person who provides
“services to two or more health information custodians where the services are provided primarily to custodians to enable the custodians to use electronic means to
disclose [PHI] to one another.” The primary purpose of a PHR product (even one
used as a data sink and data source by custodians) is not to transfer PHI between
health care providers, but to empower patients to manage their own information.77
Lastly, PHIPA is a provincial statute that regulates the collection, use, and
disclosure of personal health information by a specific class of entities within the
province of Ontario. Since many online PHR systems furnished by private sector
vendors will serve multiple jurisdictions, it is not clear that PHIPA will apply to the
majority of PHR offerings.

(iii) Implications
As demonstrated above, private sector PHR vendors are caught in a fairly minimal fashion by PHIPA. If a PHR system obtains information directly from a health
information custodian, the vendor of the system is under an obligation not to use or
disclose that information for any purpose other than to facilitate the patient’s management of her own health information. Nor should the vendor use or disclose more
information than necessary to meet this purpose. However, if the patient uploads
information into the PHR system, then PHIPA is silent.
The fact that PHR systems fall outside the ambit of Ontario’s health information legislation is not unique. Indeed, PHR systems do not appear to qualify under
British Columbia’s new e-health law, as vendors of these systems do not appear to
be a “health care body” within the meaning of the BC Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act.78 In the United States, such vendors are also outside the
scope of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.79
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In a PHR system, control over the content of a patient record rests with the patient. The
fact that health care providers may have access to a patient’s records through the vendor’s product is not determinative, since such access permitted on the basis of the patient’s express consent alone.
This is unfortunate for regulators, as subsection 6(3) of PHIPA regulation 329/04 contains a strong set of information management requirements, including provisions that
mandate audit logging, impact assessments, security assessments, and agreements with
third parties.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165.
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). See, e.g., E. Rakestraw, “One Size Doesn’t Fit
All” (2009) 30 J. Legal Med. 269. Recent legislation in the United States of America
may have changed this situation.

THE REGULATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS

267

(d) Medical Device Law
(i) Background
The government of Canada has promulgated regulations80 concerning medical
devices, under the auspices of the Food and Drugs Act. Any organization that intends to import or sell a medical device in Canada is subject to a mandatory licensure regime. The requirements for licences, and the obligations accruing to the organization, depend upon the risk category of the device, and whether the
organization is a manufacturer, retailer, distributor, or importer.
Section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act defines a “device” as any article, instrument, apparatus, or contrivance, including any component, part or accessory
thereof, manufactured, sold or represented for use in (a) the diagnosis, treatment,
mitigation or prevention of a disease, disorder or abnormal physical state, or its
symptoms, in human beings or animals; (b) restoring, correcting or modifying a
body function or the body structure of human beings or animals; (c) the diagnosis
of pregnancy in human beings or animals, or; (d) the care of human beings or animals during pregnancy and at and after birth of the offspring, including care of the
offspring.81
Schedule 1 of the Medical Devices Regulations (the “Regulations”) provides
rules for four types of medical devices: invasive, non-invasive, active, and special
cases. The Regulations also provides four risk levels, known as Classes I, II, III,
and IV; the risk level increases with integer value. Class II medical devices (and
higher) must be licensed with Health Canada. As part of the licensure process, vendors have to provide objective evidence for the safety and effectiveness of their
devices. Class I products do not need to be licensed. However, vendors importing
or selling Class I products are required to hold a Medical Device Establishment
Licence. Vendors that have acquired product-based licences for all the medical devices they deal with do not have to acquire a separate Establishment Licence.
Different licences also exist for components of systems. This is particularly
important from a software perspective, as today’s software systems are highly interconnected, which causes practical difficulties in defining concrete system
borderlines. Medical devices licensed as components must be packaged and sold
separately from the rest of the system. Class III and higher licences must be renewed in case of a significant change to the medical device. Class II licences are
renewed only if the vendor proposes to make a change to the name of the vendor,
the name of the device, the device identifier or the medical conditions, purposes or
uses for which the device is manufactured, sold, or represented.

(ii) Applicability
Software has long been an embedded component within hardware-based medical devices, (e.g., pacemakers, CT-scanners, drug infusion pumps, etc.). However,
there has been a degree of uncertainty in the manufacturing community about the
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The Medical Devices Regulations, S.O.R./98-282.
The term includes a contraceptive medical device, but does not include a drug. The
Medical Device Regulations state that the term “medical device” means a “device,” as
above, but not one intended for use in relation to animals.
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role of purely software-based products in the regulatory framework. Health Canada
has recently issued a notice that explicitly includes any kind of patient management
software (PMS) as an “active device” under the act. Risk level II is associated with
PMS that perform any function above basic data storage and retrieval, e.g., data
manipulation, visualization, decision support, etc.82 In a clarifying note, Health
Canada has indicated that PHR systems are indeed patient management software in
this regard. Health Canada has announced that it will start enforcing regulatory
compliance of Class I patient management software by February 1, 2011, and Class
II software by September 1, 2011.

(iii) Implications
Under the regulatory regime for medical devices, organizations that import,
sell, or distribute patient management software must hold an establishment licence.
In order to obtain such a licence, a vendor must provide evidence that documented
procedures are in place in respect of distribution records, complaint handling, recalls, and mandatory problem reporting. If an organization sells Class II devices,
they must also provide evidence that documented procedures are in place for storage, handling, delivery, installation and servicing of the software product.
In addition to an establishment licence, a medical device licence must be obtained for each Class II patient management software product released into the marketplace. These licences require a manufacturer to obtain a certificate showing that
its quality management system is compliant with the ISO 13485:2003 standard. In
the licence application, the company will provide the product name/identifier, the
purpose or intended use of the product, and an attestation that it meets the safety
and effectiveness and labelling requirements. The vendor’s Quality Management
System (QMS) must be documented, and the vendor must provide evidence that it
complies with both ISO 13485:2003 and applicable sections of Part I of the Regulations. The vendor must prepare a description of the medical conditions, purposes,
and uses for which the patient management software is manufactured, sold, or
represented.
In addition to these requirements, the vendor must list any standards applied in
the manufacture of the software product, in order to meet the safety and effectiveness requirements, found in sections 10 to 20 of the Regulations. Somewhat discordantly, many of the requirements involve concepts foreign to software systems,
such as sterilization, flammability, and robustness in the face of transport/storage.
Despite this incongruity, the requirements do contain several provisions that apply
to software. First, section 20 states that if “a medical device consists of or contains
software, the software shall be designed to perform as intended by the manufacturer, and the performance of the software shall be validated.” Second, section 12
states that a medical device shall “perform as intended by the manufacturer.”
Lastly, section 10 confers a duty to ensure that medical devices are designed and
manufactured to be “safe.” Manufacturers must take reasonable steps to identify the
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Health Canada, Notice, “Classification of Medical Devices Class I or Class II Patient
Management Software” (31 August 2009), online: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhpmps/md-im/activit/announce-annonce/md_notice_software_im_avis_logicelseng.php>.
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risks inherent in the device, and to either eliminate or reduce them.

(e) Standards, Certifications and Industry Guidelines
(i) Background
Canada Health Infoway (Infoway), a federally funded not-for-profit organization tasked with promoting the adoption of eHealth technologies, has recently begun to offer a certification program for “client registries, consumer health application and platforms, immunization registries, and provider registries.”83 Infoway’s
certification focuses on privacy, security and interoperability; at the time of writing,
only general information on the assessment criteria has been made available to the
public. They have been based on relatively large set of Canadian, international and
US industry standards, codes, and legislation. Interoperability and functionality criteria of eHealth systems applying for certification are assessed based on Infoway’s
published EHR architecture requirements and technical standards. Infoway intends
to generate revenue from their certification services; the organization gives paying
companies a time window of 90 days to complete the certification process, starting
from the day they receive the assessment criteria package.84
In addition to Infoway’s efforts, several provinces have initiated certification
programs. The main focus of these certifications is on eHealth systems for health
care providers (rather than consumer applications). Certifications are typically voluntary but often motivated by significant business incentives. For example, British
Columbia subsidizes doctors who install EMR systems that are approved by the
Physician Information Technology Office (PITO).
By way of comparison, certification standards for eHealth systems have been
introduced in other jurisdictions.85 As an example, the Certification Commission
for Health Information Technology (CCHIT) has been offering a variety of certification programs since 2006. Currently offerings target ambulatory EHRs, inpatient
EHRs, emergency department EHRs, and ePrescribing systems. While PHRs are
not currently targeted by the official CCHIT certification programs, a PHR certification program is under development and draft criteria have been published. Many
of the current EHR certification criteria apply to the PHR context, in particular

83

84

85

Information on the consumer health application certification process is available online: <http://internet.infoway-inforoute.ca/working-with-ehr/ solution-providers/ certification/what-infoway-certifies/consumer-health-application>.
In contrast to other industrial certification programs in other countries (e.g., programs
of the U.S. Certification Commission for Health Information Technology), no evidence
on existing Infoway-certified products has been published to date. After asking Infoway for details on their assessment criteria for research purposes, we were told that
detailed assessment criteria were released only to “bona fide” customers, i.e., paying
customers with the intent to use their certification services. This position remained unchanged even after offering to pay for the assessment package, i.e., Infoway did not
accept us as a “bona fide” customer.
Due to space concerns, we restrict our discussion to the United States. In the European
context, EuroRec has a similar mandate for developing certification programs for
health information technologies. EuroRec’s programs are still under development and
currently focus primarily on EHR systems.
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those criteria pertaining to authentication, access control, auditing, integrity, and
recovery. Additional criteria have been added to require certified PHR systems to
notify users of changes to usage policies and give them a means to seek redress
from the PHR operators in case they fail to meet performance expectations. The
draft standard also includes requirements on how to handle patient consent, proxies
(e.g., legal guardians, family members), and third party access to personal health
information in PHRs.86

(ii) Applicability
At the current time, PHRs and EHRs are sufficiently distinct concepts, offering different functionality, centred on different types of users. Therefore, industry
standards pertaining to EHRs do not readily apply to PHRs. Nevertheless, data interoperability between PHRs and EHRs has become an increasingly important objective. As a result, EHR data standards have gained influence over PHR standards
and vice-versa. For example, Infoway’s EHR architecture (data, security, and privacy requirements) is used as a basis for their certification of consumer health
products. As mentioned above, details on Infoway’s certification regime are currently unavailable to the public, making it difficult to assess the state-of-the-art
with respect to standardization in the Canadian context.

(f) Other Instruments
Health provider organizations such as hospitals and social agencies are subject
to confidentiality obligations contained in a variety of statutes, including the Public
Hospitals Act 87 and the Home Care and Community Services Act.88 While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible that provisions in
these instruments may have implications for the dissemination of data contained in
PHR systems.89
In addition, health care professionals are typically bound by professional
codes of conduct, which typically include provisions relating to confidentiality. As
an example, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario is a professional
body that has been granted certain powers under the Regulated Health Professions
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The draft standard holds that any release of information to third parties requires the
express consent of the patient; the PHR service must maintain a proof of contractual
Chain of Custody with its third party entities, which includes a) terms by which it
shares or exchanges personally identifiable, partially identifiable, or de-identified data
with third party entities, b) prohibitions against re-identification of de- identified data
without consent of the consumer, c) explicit documentation of agreements with third
party entities that involves transfer or sale of consumer information, and e) the process
by which the consumer will be contacted in the event of a violation of the Chain of
Custody Agreement.
R.S.O. 1990, c. p.40.
S.O. 1994, c. 26.
As an example, the Ontario Regulated Health Professions Act, S.O. 1991, c.18 [RHPA]
contains a Health Professions Procedural Code whose confidentiality requirements
take precedence over PHIPA.
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Act90 and the Medicine Act.91 Regulations made under the latter statute have a direct bearing on the ability of physicians to maintain PHI in electronic records. In
particular, section 20 of the Medicine Act’s O. Reg.114/94 permits physicians to
create and maintain patient medical records in an electronic computer system only
if the system meets certain criteria. As an example, the system must collect audit
trails, showing the date/time a patient’s record was accessed, any changes made at
the time of access, and the original data before the access. The system must “include a password or otherwise provide reasonable protection against unauthorized
access.” The regulations require that a system used by a physician “automatically
backs up files and allows the recovery of backed-up files or otherwise provides
reasonable protection against loss of, damage to, and inaccessibility of,
information.”

IV. ANALYSIS
This section addresses the obligations incumbent on private sector PHR vendors, from the perspective of a regulator wishing to address the three categories of
issues mentioned above. While there are significant gaps, at least some of the relevant issues have been covered by legal requirements found in the various instruments mentioned above.

(a) Strengths
The various legal instruments outlined above have some positive effects on the
issues involved in commercializing PHR systems. First, the current regulatory
framework imposes constraints on the ability of vendors to use or disclose PHI.
Subsections 5(3), 7(2), and 7(3) of PIPEDA (as well as several clauses in Schedule
1) place limits on the ability of a vendor to use or disclose personal information. In
addition, one of the provisions in the “Individual Access” principle obligates vendors to provide an audit trail of all uses to which personal information has been put,
and the third parties to which it has been disclosed.92 If applicable in the circumstances, subsections 49(1) and 49(2) of PHIPA also impose constraints on the ability of vendors to use or disclose information that has been uploaded by health information custodians.93 In the event that a vendor wishes to engage third parties to
perform processing or archiving of personal information, the “Accountability” principle in PIPEDA’s Schedule 1 dictates that the vendor must use “contractual or
other means” to provide a comparable level of protection while the information is
being processed.
Second, the various instruments contain guidance on security measures. For
instance, the “Safeguards” principle in PIPEDA confers upon vendors an obligation

90
91
92
93

RHPA, supra note 89.
S.O. 1991, c. 30.
PIPEDA, supra note 41, Sch. 1 s. 4.9.1.
Similar to the case of disclosure to outside organizations, the leakage of personal information to third party applications is an eventuality that should be anticipated by PHR
vendors. These vendors are therefore under an obligation (through PIPEDA and/or
PHIPA) to prevent such leakage.
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to protect personal information in a PHR from loss and theft, as well as unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use, or modification.94 The “Safeguards” principle provides space for organizations to vary the nature of the safeguards in response
to the sensitivity of the information, and presumably the nature and likelihood of
the salient risks.95 If physicians are uploading information to the PHR, the Ontario
Medicine Act also requires the use of safeguards, including audit trails and reasonable protection against unauthorized access, loss, damage, or inaccessibility of
information.
Third, the integrity dimension of security is at least partially addressed in the
instruments that were surveyed above. Unauthorized modification of personal information is covered by the “Safeguards” principle of PIPEDA.96 While the
PIPEDA principle of “Accuracy” appears to operate at a higher level of granularity
than the traditional notion of data integrity, the Medical Devices Regulations could
provide some guidance on reducing risks. Section 20 of the Regulations states that
if “a medical device consists of or contains software, the software shall be designed
to perform as intended by the manufacturer, and the performance of the software
shall be validated.” According to IEEE Standard 610, software validation is “the
process of evaluating software during or at the end of the development process to
determine whether it satisfies specified requirements.” Applying this definition to
the section 20 of the Regulations implies that the vendors need to keep an explicit
specification of the intended performance for their software — a specification that
should include functional requirements, as well as non-functional properties (e.g.,
data security, integrity, etc.). Furthermore, section 10 of the Regulations confers
upon vendors a duty to identify the risks inherent in PHR software, and to either
eliminate or reduce them.
Fourth, the various instruments force PHR vendors to put in place administrative mechanisms to support the protection of privacy. The “Accountability” principle forces a vendor to designate an individual who is accountable for the organization’s compliance with PIPEDA; it also mandates that the vendor implement
various policies and practices, including a) procedures to protect personal information; b) procedures to receive and respond to complaints and inquiries; c) staff
training; and d) developing information to explain these and other policies and procedures. Furthermore, an Establishment Licence forces a vendor to provide evidence that documented procedures are in place in respect of distribution records,
complaint handling, recalls, and mandatory problem reporting.

(b) Weaknesses
Although the various instruments cover some of the issues with PHR systems,
it is clear that there are many outstanding issues worthy of further investigation by
academics, industry groups, and regulators.97 First, it is not clear that the safeguards mandated by PIPEDA are sufficient for addressing the main security risks
94
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PIPEDA, supra note 41, Sch. 1 s. 4.7.1.
Ibid. Sch. 1 s. 4.7.2.
Supra note 92.
Due to space constraints, we will only discuss a few major issues in the remainder of
this article.
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of PHR systems. Much of the guidance in PIPEDA concerns basic security precautions, such as passwords and locked filing cabinets. It is not clear that the major
security risks of PHR systems (particularly those using social networking architectures) are thoroughly addressed using these methods, as many of the issues involved are novel.98 Schedule 1 of PIPEDA does state that personal information
must be protected by security safeguards “appropriate to the sensitivity of the information,” creating an obligation for organizations to customize their security procedures. However, it is not clear that this is coextensive with an obligation to address
security issues that are unique or novel to the domain, as opposed to merely applying sufficient traditional safeguards. The main issue with respect to PIPEDA is that
there are no settled “best practices” to determine what standards vendors would
have to meet to safeguard data in social networks or PHR systems.99
While the Medical Devices Regulations is much more specific, the bulk of the
obligations concern quality, with an emphasis on the nature of the manufacturing
process. Although quality is undoubtedly an important topic for PHR products, a
focus on quality does not address the privacy and security concerns outlined above.
As an example, the Regulations use the concept of “safety,” which does not prima
facie subsume privacy and security issues. The most promising aspect of the medical device regime is the requirement to identify and eliminate “risks” in the
software. As in the case of PIPEDA, it is not clear that best practices have been
established in the social networking and PHR domain; nor is it clear whether the
word “risk,” in the context of the Regulations, covers all of the privacy and security
concerns associated with these products.100
Second, there are many unanswered questions concerning the suitability of
medical device law as a framework for regulating patient management software. To
take but one example, interoperable PHR products will likely be categorized as
Class II patient management systems, requiring product-focused licences. However, the current licensing regime does not require renewal of the licence when the
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For instance, signalling and secondary disclosure issues in PHR systems are not completely addressed by standard security measures. In addition, some attacks on social
networking systems are actually compatible with the presence of traditional safeguards;
some only require an attacker to analyze the network using authorized methods, such as
search functionality. For a technical example, see J. Staddon, “Finding ‘hidden’ connections on LinkedIn: an argument for more pragmatic social network privacy” (2009)
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Security and Artificial intelligence AISec
’09.
99
Of course, the Commissioner can investigate the use of safeguards in the course of
making a decision, as occurred in PIPEDA Case Summary #2006-356. (Customer’s
banking personal information found in a recycling bin). In order to provide objectivity,
recommendations for those security and privacy risks unique to PHR or social networking applications should be based on a body of best practices.
100 The issue of whether the term “risk” as used in the Medical Device Regulations would
capture privacy and security vulnerabilities in patient management software is a topic
beyond the scope of this paper. At an intuitive level, one might ask whether the term
“risk”, used a statute initially devised for medical devices such as pacemakers, would
cover scenarios that involve administrative or usage-level vulnerabilities, as opposed to
issues with the device itself.
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software changes. This is a grave problem, since software problems may emerge in
subsequent major releases and revisions of the products. A product-focused certification regime that does not take into account the evolutionary nature of software
will not be effective.
Another problem is that the “software as a product” paradigm is currently
shifting to a “software as a service” (SaaS) paradigm. Many PHRs are provided as
services, rather than shipped products. The Medical Devices Regulations do not
sufficiently address this notion of medical devices as a service. Another problem
pertains to the unclear notion of what constitutes “custom developed” software.
Health Canada explicitly excludes “custom developed” software from the licensure
requirement. However, a sufficiently precise definition of this term is missing. It
can be argued that virtually all patient management software developed today
makes some use of pre-existing software components (e.g., libraries), while it can
also be argued that most patient management software can customized in one form
or another to a particular customer context.
Third, it seems that none of the instruments above contain provisions mandating that a vendor notify either users or regulators in the case of a privacy breach.
While breach notification provisions are found in PHIPA, our analysis showed that
this statute has limited application to private sector PHR vendors.101
Fourth, there is a fair bit of uncertainty concerning retention periods for personal information. The “Limiting Use, Disclosure and Retention” principle of
PIPEDA urges organizations to develop guidelines and implement procedures with
respect to the retention of personal information, including minimum and maximum
periods.102 It further recommends that personal information that is no longer required to “fulfill the identified purposes” should be destroyed, erased, or made
anonymous.103 Apart from this restriction, the choice of retention period seems (in
the absence of other relevant legislation) to be at the discretion of the vendor.104
Additional pieces of legislation like the Ontario Medicine Act may specify retention
periods105 for patient medical records in the custody and control of a physician, but
these are of questionable applicability in the case of a private sector PHR vendor.
This state of affairs does not provide PHR users with a high degree of control over
the longevity of their data.
Fifth, a major issue exists with respect to subsection 9(1) of PIPEDA, which
prohibits secondary disclosures of information. In particular, PIPEDA states that an
organization “shall not give an individual access to personal information if doing so
would likely reveal personal information about a third party.”106 Given the heredi-
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Although breach notification may be included in a forthcoming revision to PIPEDA,
the lack of such an obligation is a serious issue at present.
PIPEDA, supra note 41, Sch. 1 s. 4.5.2.
Ibid. Sch. 1 s. 4.5.3.
The Model Code states that personal information used to make a decision should be
retained long enough to allow an individual to access the information after the decision
has been made. Section 8(8) of PIPEDA is also relevant.
Specifically, Subsection 19(1) of O. Reg.114/94 under the Medicine Act, supra note 91.
If the information about the third party is severable from the record, the organization
may sever the information.
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tary nature of many diseases, subsection 9(1) may prohibit PHR vendors from offering their systems as a data source for health care practitioners, even if the patient
has provided the health practitioner with access rights to the PHR.
Sixth, none of the instruments mentioned above deal with the issues of trust
that were introduced above. The issue of duplicitous users posing as patients or
physicians is likely better addressed through registration procedures and industrysponsored certification regimes, rather than legislation. Bias by commercial interests remains a residual risk, and an effort to address the quality of information in a
PHR with respect to provenance involves multi-jurisdictional and multi-party negotiations and agreements.
Seventh, the PHR landscape lacks standards for interoperability. As mentioned above, the high costs of switching PHR vendors may provide a disincentive
for users to abandon a vendor whose services are lacking. In the absence of messaging middleware that allows exchange of data between disparate data models, it
is likely that data interoperability will remain a key issue in the near future.
Eighth, many of the issues associated with social networking techniques are
unaddressed by the various instruments outlined above. The complexity of interactions in these systems typically makes it difficult for users to assess risk, and to
understand privacy policies. The ease of forming online networks can make it difficult to judge one’s exposure. Furthermore, social networks are subject to attacks
that are not possible in traditional applications, such as the inference of an individual’s characteristics from facts about her friends.107 These issues seem to lie
outside the scope of traditional security safeguards, leaving them unaddressed apart
from a small amount of work occurring in the research community.

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has served as a brief introduction to the status of private sector
PHR vendors in the Canadian legal context. Eschewing the common law for reasons of brevity, the paper covered the impact of statutes, regulations, certification
regimes, and industry standards on the nascent PHR landscape. While the current
legal framework addresses some of the major issues with PHR systems, other risks
and vulnerabilities remain unaddressed.
In particular, we have seen that major issues remain with respect to interoperability, trust, social networking, secondary disclosures, safeguards, and retention
periods. The most significant issues from our perspective are (a) the lack of emphasis on interoperability; (b) issues with using medical device law to regulate
software systems, and; (c) the residual risk concerning the scope of the security
obligations contained in the various instruments. Lastly, the health care domain has
unique features that are not well served by standard approaches to privacy, as we
demonstrated in our brief discussion of genetic diseases and secondary disclosures.
Given the efforts of the federal commissioner to regulate the use of social networks, it appears that Canada is not entirely unprepared for the emergence of PHR
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systems. However, much work remains to be done in understanding the legal implications of these applications. It is our hope that this paper will serve as a useful
introduction for policy makers, regulators, vendors, and academics. However wellequipped our regulatory system, it appears that the personal health record is here to
stay.

